Abstract. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a powerful primitive in modern cryptography, often used in a context of semi-honest adversaries. Committed oblivious transfer (COT) is an enhancement involving the use of commitments, which can be used in many applications of OT covering particular malicious adversarial behavior. For OT, many protocols are known that cover the transfer of bit strings rather than just single bits. For COT, though, the known protocols only cover the transfer of bits. In this paper, we thus present efficient COT protocols for transferring (long) bit strings, which perform quite well in comparison to the most efficient COT protocols for bits. We prove the security of our protocols following the simulation paradigm in the cryptographic model, also assuming the random oracle model for efficient non-interactive proofs. Also, as a motivation for the use of COT instead of OT, we point out that a protocol which uses OT as a subprotocol may have subtle security issues in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography. After Rabin introduced oblivious transfer [Rab81] a huge number of papers appeared regarding possible extensions, variants and applications of oblivious transfer. In Rabin's original oblivious transfer, the sender has a secret and sends it to a chooser who receives the secret with probability 1/2 while the sender does not know whether the secret has been received. Later, Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85] presented 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT), where the sender has two values s 0 and s 1 and the chooser has a selection bit b. Upon completion of the protocol, the chooser holds the value s b while the sender does not know which of the two values s 0 and s 1 the chooser got who, in turn, learns nothing about s 1−b . Crépeau [Cré87] showed that Rabin's OT and 1-out-of-2 OT are equivalent. 1-out-of-2 OT will be called standard OT throughout the rest of the paper.
Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) is obtained as a natural combination of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer and bit commitments. This notion was first introduced by Crépeau [Cré90] under the name Verifiable Oblivious Transfer. Later, Crépeau et al. [CvdGT95] presented a more efficient COT protocol and showed that from COT one can construct a protocol for general secure multi-party computation in the malicious case. Briefly, in these variants of oblivious transfer, the parties running the protocol are committed to their input values prior to the protocol. That is, if the sender has two private values to be obliviously transferred to the chooser who has a selection bit, all these input values must have been committed to by the respective parties before the transfer starts. At the end of the protocol, the chooser will receive one of the corresponding private values of the sender together with a (public) commitment by the chooser.
For many applications in which OT is used as a subprotocol, the security of the overall protocol is considered only in the semi-honest model. However, there may be subtle security issues when such protocols using OT are extended to the malicious case. We highlight this in this paper and we describe how COT helps to overcome these problems. Namely, the link between OT and the surrounding protocol can be securely done with the use of COT.
Since efficient COT protocols for transferring bits are known, one may thus replace applications of OT of bits by COT of bits. An interesting question is how to do the same when transferring bit strings. This is the starting point of this work. In this paper, we present efficient protocols for string COT based on any (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem.
Related Work
Garay et al. [GMY04] present the most efficient COT protocol to date realizing COT functionality in the Universal Composable (UC) framework of Canetti [Can00] . However, this protocol only works for bits whereas our protocol allow for bit strings of arbitrary length (up to the length of plaintexts of the underlying threshold homomorphic cryptosystem, or a multiple thereof). In this paper, we will just consider a stand-alone setting, noting that the efficiency of our protocols improves the efficiency of the UC-protocols of [GMY04] when trimmed down to a stand-alone setting (replacing, e.g., the use of Ω-protocols by Σ-protocols).
If the parties are committed to the inputs of the OT protocol but there is no commitment to chooser's output we refer to this variant as Verifiable OT (VOT) in this paper. In this direction, Cachin and Camenisch [CC00] as well as Jarecki and Shmatikov [JS07] present protocols for VOT in 2 rounds. These protocols can be converted into COT by requesting the chooser to recommit to its received value and to prove the validity of this commitment w.r.t. the commitments for the inputs. In general, this incurs one extra communication round.
Lipmaa [Lip03] also presents a protocol under the name verifiable homomorphic oblivious transfer for strings. However, verifiability is defined in a different sense. The chooser will get commitments to all inputs of the sender which can later be used and referred to by the surrounding protocol. Similarly, the sender gets an encryption of the chooser's input. Hence, this is yet another form of OT, which is related to COT and VOT, and is somewhat similar to the notion of "committing OT", introduced later in [KS06] .
Recently, Camenisch et al. [CNs07] presented a protocol for adaptive OT, in which a sender has a list of messages and a receiver adaptively chooses one message after the other. To prevent the so-called selective-failure problem mentioned in [CNs07] (which is similar to the problem discussed in [KS06] , see below), the sender is required to commit to its input list of messages and to prove consistency w.r.t. this list in all ensuing runs of adaptive OT.
More generally, we note that standard OT protocols, which are secure in a stand-alone setting, must be carefully dealt with when used as subroutines in higher level protocols. Kiraz and Schoenmakers [KS06] show that there are actually several protocols in the literature (e.g., [Pin03, MNPS04, MF06] ) where the use of standard OT compromises the overall security of the protocol. Namely, a malicious sender may put 'bogus' values instead of the correct messages, and by doing so, compromise the privacy of the surrounding protocol. The use of COT or VOT protocols may prevent such problems.
Our contributions
We present a protocol that implements COT, assuming that a (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem has been setup before (as in, e.g., [CDN01] ). This setting also allows for multiple (sequential) runs of the COT protocol, amortizing the initial cost of setting up the (2,2)-threshold cryptosystem. Our COT protocol efficiently transfers bit strings. Using the random oracle model our protocol achieves 2 rounds of interaction.
Compared to the COT protocol of [GMY04] , which works for bits only, the cost of transferring O(k)-bit strings (for security parameter k) using our protocol is comparable to the cost of transferring a single bit using the protocol of [GMY04] . Compared to the 2-round VOT protocol of [JS07] for bit strings, which can be turned into a 3-round COT protocol (see above), our protocol uses one round less and is also computationally more efficient. However, [JS07] only assumes a common reference string (CRS) containing an RSA modulus (among other things), while we assume that a (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem has been setup.
The security analysis of our COT protocol is done using the simulation paradigm, in the model described by [Lip03] . Although the privacy for both parties is computational (as the commitments in our protocol are public key encryptions), we show a simulation which produces a statistically indistinguishable view of the COT protocol for both parties. Hence, the COT protocol does not divulge any information beyond what can be inferred from the encryptions (which are used as computationally hiding commitments).
Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give some notation and definitions which are used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we present our COT protocol together with a proof of security. In Section 4, we discuss the complexity of our protocol and compare with previous solutions. In Section 5, we discuss some applications which have some issues with the use of OT and motivate COT instead and finally we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
Threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. Our results apply to any threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. Briefly, let E(m, r) denote the encryption of value m using randomness r for a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. Often the randomness is omitted in the notation, writing E(m). A cryptosystem is additively homomorphic if the product E(m 1 )E(m 2 ) results in E(m 1 + m 2 ). As a consequence, for any public constant c, E(m)
c is an encryption whose plaintext is cm.
In a (t, n)-threshold cryptosystem there are n parties, each of them holds a share of the overall secret key. There is a public key which allows anyone to encrypt messages. If at least t parties cooperate, any encryption can be successfully decrypted, whereas any collusion of less than t parties cannot get any information about the plaintext.
There are various instances of threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. The most widely used are (based on) ElGamal or Paillier. Threshold homomorphic ElGamal has the drawback of only allowing decryption of values belonging to a relatively small set, for which it is feasible to compute discrete logs. On the other hand, Paillier does not have this problem and allows decryption of encrypted values in an arbitrarily large set (e.g., 1024-bit integers). However, the distributed key generation protocol for threshold Paillier is very expensive compared to that for threshold ElGamal. It is also possible to use an amalgam of ElGamal and Paillier cryptosystems: the key generation protocol it is that of ElGamal, while allowing decryption of full-size plaintexts like in Paillier. One drawback of the latter is that the security of the cryptosystem relies on two computational assumptions (see [DJ03] ).
Σ-protocols. A Σ-protocol for a relation R = {(v; w)} is a 3-round protocol between a prover and a verifier, where the prover acts first. Both parties have the value v as common input, and the prover has a witness w as private input, where (v; w) ∈ R. A Σ-protocol is a proof of knowledge for relation R which satisfies special soundness and (special) honest-verifier zero-knowledge. See [CDS94] for further details. Moreover, non-interactive Σ-proofs are easily obtained in the random oracle model.
We will also use the fact that both for homomorphic ElGamal encryptions and for Paillier encryptions, there are efficient Σ-protocols for the relation R enc = {(e; m, r) : e = E(m, r)}, proving knowledge of the message m and randomness r for a given encryption e = E(m, r).
(Non-Interactive) Public and Private Threshold Decryption. Given a ciphertext in the (t, n)-threshold cryptosystem, at least t parties willing to decrypt, produce shares of the decryption, based on their respective shares of the secret key. This information is broadcast and with this, everyone can simply recover the plaintext by using a reconstruction algorithm. Putting this more formally, on ciphertext c, at least t parties broadcast c i = D ski (c), where sk i denotes the secret key share for the i-th party. Later, everyone can perform m = R(c 1 , . . . , c t ) where c = E(m), where R denotes the public reconstruction algorithm.
In order to withstand malicious adversaries, parties have to prove that the decryption share c i is correctly computed. For this, they use a Σ-protocol for the relation R tdec = {(c i , c; sk i ) :
For the security of this process, and for later use in our security proofs, we assume that if t − 1 parties are corrupted, then there is a simulator that on inputs e = E(m, r), the message m, and the t − 1 shares of the private key for the corrupted parties, it can produce a statistically indistinguishable view of the decryption protocol. The concrete details on how to do this depend on the specific threshold encryption scheme used. For examples, see [ST04, Section 2] for the homomorphic threshold ElGamal, and [DJ01, Section 4.1] for the threshold Paillier cryptosystem.
In our protocol, we consider a variant of the threshold decryption protocol, the so-called private threshold decryption [CDN01, full version]. Here, the requirement is that one of the t parties will be the only party who will recover the secret. This is easily achieved: all t − 1 other parties follow the protocol, and broadcast their shares (along with the proofs of correctness). The party who will learn the plaintext proceeds with the decryption process privately, collects all decryption shares from the t − 1 other parties, and privately reconstructs the message. Note that the remaining parties will not get any information about this message.
Secure multi-party computation from threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. Cramer, Damgård and Nielsen [CDN01] present a framework to build secure multiparty computation of any functionality that can be expressed as an arithmetic circuit (or formulae). Roughly, on inputs e 1 = E(m 1 ) and e 2 = E(m 2 ) where m 1 and m 2 may be unknown to everybody, parties can compute E(m 1 + m 2 ) without interaction because of homomorphic properties. To compute E(m 1 m 2 ) parties must engage in a secure multiplication protocol. If in the latter case one of the values, say m 1 , is private to one of the parties, this party can compute e = e m1 2 E(0, r) proving that this is the case. Clearly, e encrypts m 1 m 2 . This protocol is usually referred to as private-multiplier (see, e.g., [ST04] ). For later use in the paper, the relation for the proof given in the private-multiplier gate is denoted as R pm = {(e 1 , e 2 , e; m 1 , r 1 , r) : e 1 = E(m 1 , r 1 ) ∧ e = e m1 2 E(0, r)}. For later use in the simulation of our protocols, given E(m 1 ), E(m 2 ) and E(m 1 m 2 ), the private-multiplier gate can be statistically simulated when there are at most t − 1 corrupted parties in a (t, n)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. For details, see [CDN01,DJ01,ST04,DN03].
Encryptions as Commitments. A probabilistic public key encryption scheme can be used as a non-interactive commitment scheme. One party commits to a message by encrypting it. The opening is done by disclosing the message and the randomness used.
In this scenario we have to be careful: the holder of the private key can always see the contents of any commitment of this type and, depending on the encryption scheme used, this party might recover the randomness and therefore virtually open any commitment.
1 This compromises the hiding property for the commiter that do not know the secret key.
We can resolve this issue with the following two possible actions: using the encryption scheme as a commitment without allowing any of the parties to know the secret key; while another suitable alternative could be to set up a threshold encryption scenario. In this way, the ability to decrypt can be distributed in a threshold fashion (possibly letting the threshold be the total number of parties).
Given a commitment e = E(m, r), its committer in this scenario is the party that knows both the message m and the randomness r. Note that parties can run private threshold homomorphic decryption w.r.t. one party to retrieve the message behind e, but this not always allows the recipient to obtain the randomness used in e (e.g., ElGamal), and therefore this party will not be able to open e as a commitment. If party P is the committer of e = E(m, r) we denote it by e = commit P (m, r).
Committed Oblivious Transfer. In 1-out-of-2 OT there are two parties: the sender S, who inputs two private values s 0 and s 1 ; and the chooser C who has a selection bit b. At the end, C receives the value s b . The main security requirement of any protocol implementing OT is that after running the protocol S will not gain any information about the C's selection bit b; and C will be ignorant about the value of s 1−b . Definition 1. A COT protocol is run between the parties S and C. At the beginning there public commitments commit S (s 0 , r 0 ), commit S (s 1 , r 1 ), and commit C (b, r). S inputs s 0 , s 1 and r 0 , r 1 , while C inputs b, r. At the end of the protocol, C receives s b and a fresh commitment commit C (s b , u) is publicly available. S learns nothing about b while C has no clue about s 1−b . (See Figure 1) Now we point out the difference between COT and VOT in more detail. COT and VOT are identical except that in VOT the commitment by the chooser to its selected value s b is not required. Keeping this in mind, we notice that [Cré90, CvdGT95, CD97, GMY04] are papers that present COT (of bits). Instead, in [CC00, JS07] only VOT protocols are presented. However, the different use of these terms causes some confusion: Crépeau [Cré90] introduces COT under the name of VOT, Jarecki and Shmatikov [JS07] present protocols for VOT, while they use the term COT. In the latter paper, they present a UC-secure VOT protocol (which for them is a COT), modifying the definition of the ideal functionality for COT by Garay et al.
[GMY04] to make it into VOT. It is straightforward to see that in line with our definitions COT implies VOT by just ignoring the output commitment. Vice versa, a VOT protocol can be turned into a COT protocol by adding a round in which the chooser commits to the received bit string and proves the validity of the commitment.
Security definitions. The main security obligation is to show that our protocol achieves the privacy requirements for COT. There are protocols in the literature that achieve unconditional privacy for one of the parties (e.g., [NP01, Tze02, Lip03] ) while the privacy for the other party on a computational assumption. As our commitments are encryptions of the underlying threshold public key cryptosystem, we can only give computational privacy to both parties. However, our protocol achieves more than computational privacy: we show that for any corrupted party (sender or chooser) there exists a simulator that produces a view of the protocol which is statistically indistinguishable from the view of the corrupted party executing a real instance of the protocol. This has clear consequences in the framework of [CDN01] : a successful attacker to our protocol is an attacker to the security of underlying cryptosystem without loss in its success probability. This results in modular security proofs of higher level protocols that use our COT as a subroutine.
To carry out such simulations, we proceed as follows. Assuming that one party is corrupted, we build an efficient simulator that has access to the public input, private secret shares of secret key and, as done in [Lip03] , the private output in the case that the chooser is corrupted. Besides, the simulator knows the public output.
Committed Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section, we will present our COT protocol. A (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem is assumed to be set up. We let E denote the encryption algorithm of this cryptosystem, and as explained above, we also use E as a non-interactive commitment scheme.
Let e 0 = E(s 0 , r 0 ) and e 1 = E(s 1 , r 1 ) be the commitments to the sender's input strings s 0 and s 1 , and e = E(b, r) be the commitment to the chooser's selection bit b.
Using the general approach to secure multiparty computation of [CDN01] , the COT protocol corresponds to the secure evaluation of an arithmetic circuit given by t = b(s 1 − s 0 ) + s 0 which clearly returns s 0 if b = 0 and s 1 when b = 1. This approach is so general that even s 0 , s 1 and b need not be known to any party. Note that the output of the evaluation will be an encryption e = E(t) = E(s b ). If inputs (s 0 , s 1 ) and/or b are known to the respective parties then one can securely compute e using a private-multiplier gate (instead of a secure multiplication gate), resulting in a more efficient protocol.
Once e is obtained, according to one of the COT requirements, only the chooser must recover the plaintext. For this, we use private decryption, where the chooser is the one who will learn the plaintext inside e .
To complete the COT protocol, the chooser needs to commit to the received value s b , and to prove that it does so correctly. In principle, this can be done using some proofs of knowledge. However, we will use the fact that our commitments are encryptions for a threshold cryptosystem: to prove that a fresh commitment e to output s b is correct, we observe that this proof equivalent to show that e /e is an encryption of 0. The latter statement is proved by actually decrypting e /e .
As a final remark, we see that if the chooser starts producing e , it turns out that it has to wait for the decryption share of it from the sender, so that it later can produce the fresh commitment as just explained. This results in at least 3 rounds of communication. However, if the sender starts, it produces e and at the same time the decryption share for e , which reduces the overall strategy to at least 2 rounds of communication. In both cases, the computational cost is actually the same. For this reason, we only go into the details of this second approach, as it results in a more efficient way of doing COT.
2-round COT protocol
We now present our protocol for COT. This protocol has two rounds and it is quite efficient compared to the state of the art. In the beginning of the protocol, we take advantage of the fact that the values for the commitments e 0 , e 1 and e are known to the respective parties. The protocol is as follows.
Step 1. The sender produces e = E(b(s 1 − s 0 ) + s 0 ) = e (s1−s0) · e 0 · E(0, r ) and the Σ-proof for relation R pm on (e, e 1 /e 0 , e /e 0 ; s 1 − s 0 , r 1 − r 0 , r ). The sender also produces its decryption share s S of e , along with the Σ-proof for relation R tdec on (e , s S ; sk S ).
Step 2. After checking the two proofs given by the sender, and if they pass, the chooser then produces its corresponding decryption share for e , denoted as s C . Combining s S and s C , the chooser gets s b . Immediately, the chooser produces a fresh encryption e = E(s b , u) for a fresh random u, and generates its decryption share for e /e , denoted asŝ C . Then, e andŝ C are sent along with the Σ-proofs for R enc and R tdec on inputs (e ; s b , u) and (e /e ,ŝ C ; sk C ) respectively.
Step 3. Finally, upon receiving e , the sender produces its decryption share for e /e , denoted asŝ S . This is combined withŝ C to check whether the resulting decrypted value is 0. If so, the sender accepts e as a valid commitment for the chooser's output. Otherwise, the sender rejects.
The protocol is sketched in Figure 2 .
Committed OT of bit strings
Common Input, Private Input s0, s1, , r0, r1, skS e = E(b, r), b, r, skC e0 = E(s0, r0), e1 = E(s1, r1) The value s b denotes the output of the chooser after privately decrypting e . When this value has been computed, a fresh commitment to s b (denoted as e ) by the chooser has to be sent in order to fulfill the COT requirement that the chooser's output must be committed. Notice here that without the fresh commitment to s b the protocol fulfill the VOT requirement in one round only.
Security analysis
For the security analysis, we are going to prove that this protocol fulfills the privacy requirements for COT. We are going to show that given a party is corrupted, there exists a simulator that can produce a view which is statistically indistinguishable from the view of that party interacting with the other honest party.
Before starting the proof we make some remarks in the security model to make the proof precise. As we mentioned earlier, before the simulation is run the simulator already knows the shares of the secret key of the corrupted party. The reason is that the threshold cryptosystem is set up before the protocol starts, and therefore we assume that the simulator extracts this information when the distributed key generation is run.
Also, in case the chooser is corrupted, we use the approach in [Lip03] : the simulator will be given access to the received value by the chooser. From this and public information, we construct a simulator that produces an indistinguishable view for the adversary w.r.t. the view in the real execution.
Finally, we remind that the protocol gives computational privacy to both parties, the sender and the chooser, because of the semantic security of the underlying cryptosystem. Going a bit further than computational privacy, we now show that the protocol is simulatable for both parties and those simulations produce views which are statistically indistinguishable from the views in the real protocol executions. Theorem 1. On the sender's inputs s 0 , s 1 (and randomness r 0 and r 1 ), the chooser's private selection bit b (and randomness r), where public commitments to the parties' inputs e 0 = E(s 0 , r 0 ), e 1 = E(s 1 , r 1 ), and e = E(b, r) are available, the COT protocol privately gives s b (and a fresh randomness u) to the chooser, along with a public commitment e = E(s b , u).
Proof. As we argued before, we assume that one of the parties is corrupted. Based on public information besides of its private decryption share, we show a simulation which produces a view to the adversary that is statistically indistinguishable from the view in the real protocol execution.
In all cases, a set of valid public inputs is available: e is a commitment to the chooser's selection bit, and e 0 , e 1 are respective commitments to the sender's inputs. Also, the simulator is assumed to get the public output commitment e which is a valid commitment to chooser's received value.
Case 1-The chooser is corrupted. We first prove the security for the case that the chooser is corrupted. The simulator has the chooser's private key share sk C , and received value s b , apart from the public commitments. From this information, the simulator constructs a view for the chooser which is statistically close to the one when interacting with the honest sender.
The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. The simulator computes e = e · E(0). The value e together with a simulation of the private-multiplier gate (over multiplicands e and e 1 /e 0 and result e /e 0 ) are output.
2. At the same time, the decryption share s S can be simulated given e , its plaintext (which is s b ) and the share of private key sk C of the chooser. All proofs at this stage are also simulated.
This completes the simulation for the malicious chooser. The transcript is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the chooser's view when interacting with the honest sender.
Case 2-The sender is corrupted. We next prove the security for the case that the sender is corrupted. The simulator has only sender's private key share sk S and all public information as described above. From this information, the simulator constructs a view for the sender which is statistically close to the one when interacting with the honest chooser. The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. The simulator waits until the sender produces the encryption e and the decryption share for e . The simulator checks all the proofs as if the honest chooser would check in the real protocol execution. If all proofs are passed, the simulator goes on, otherwise it aborts. 2. Now, simulator prepares e as e · E(0) and outputs it along with a simulated proof of knowledge. Also, it simulatesŝ C calling the simulator to the decryption process on inputs e /e , plaintext 0 and the sender's secret key share sk S .
This completes the simulation for the malicious sender. The transcript is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the sender's view when interacting with the honest receiver.
Complexity analysis and comparison
Our protocol involves only a constant computational, communication and round complexities. When studied in similar frameworks, our protocols are as efficient as the COT protocol by Garay et al. [GMY04] which is the most efficient one up to now. We stress that the protocol of Garay et al. works in a stronger model, since they are interested in the UC framework. We, instead, will adapt their protocol to our framework to be able to carry out a comparison.
In the following, we present the precise description for the complexity of our protocol. For a concrete result we use (2,2)-threshold ElGamal cryptosystem by considering offline computations. In the protocol by Garay et al. they need Ω-protocols for the proofs of knowledge. For simplicity, we trimmed them down to the simpler Σ-protocols. This is done to make a reasonable comparison.
COT protocol by Garay et al. Let's roughly sketch the protocol idea. The CRS consists of the pair (g, h), where nobody knows the discrete log x of h to the base g, i.e. h = g
x . The protocol uses Pedersen commitments, and so, let E 0 = g r0 h s0
and E 1 = g r1 h s1 denote the commitment to sender's inputs s 0 and s 1 . Also,
is the commitment to chooser's input b. The protocol has the following two main steps:
1. The sender "re-encrypts" E 0 and E 1 under the 'keys' E and E/h respectively. Denote E 0 and E 1 the resulting encryptions. Note that E b will be re-encrypted with the key g r . It also proves that this is done correctly. 2. The chooser can only "decrypt" the message in E b as it knows the secret exponent r, recovering s b . On the other hand, the chooser cannot decrypt E 1−b unless the discrete-log of h to the base g is known. To finish, the chooser has to recommit to the received value s b and prove that this is the case.
See [GMY04] for more details. In the first step, for the reencryption, 4 exponentiations are computed by the sender (2 of them can be off-line). The proofs at that step cost 16 exponentiations (8 of them can be off-line). As for the second step, the chooser needs only 1 on-line exponentiation to retrieve the chosen value. To finish, the chooser computes a fresh commitment which costs 1 off-line exponentiation. The proof of knowledge at the end costs 8 exponentiations (4 can be off-line). In total, there are 15 on-line and 15 off-line exponentiations.
VOT by Jarecki and Shmatikov. We now just sketch the VOT protocol in [JS07] . The input commitments are encryptions under a homomorphic public key cryptosystem (the public key is part of the CRS). The chooser first sends a new public key together with the encryption of its selection bit under this new cryptosystem, proving that this is done correctly. Later, the sender encrypts its inputs under this new public key, combining them with the encryption for the selection bit. Finally, the chooser can decrypt both ciphertexts, but only one of them contains the selected value, and the other one is random.
To convert it into COT, the chooser must recommit to its received value, producing a proof that the value encrypted is consistent with previous commitments. This protocol results in 3 rounds. This scheme virtually works for any homomorphic encryption. When instantiated to additively homomorphic ElGamal, for the sake of our comparison, the protocol is slightly less efficient than that of [GMY04] , around 17 on-line and 16 off-line exponentiations (mainly due to the generation of the new cryptosystem, the recommitment of the selection bit and the respective proofs of knowledge). Meanwhile, for the VOT protocol, the cost is 13 and 10 on-line and off-line exponentiations, resp.
Our COT protocol. Now we present the computational cost for our protocol in the case of (2,2)-threshold ElGamal. In Table 1 we study the computational complexity of the building blocks used in our protocol. For the private-multiplier gate, we include the cost of producing the output plus the Σ-proof for relation R pm . In the case of the private threshold decryption, we include the costs for generation of the decryption shares and one Σ-proof for R tdec . And finally, we consider the recommitment at the last step. Concretely, in the case of e , chooser has to encrypt to the received value plus the Σ-proof for the knowledge of the randomness used in that encryption. This suffices as if chooser passes this proof and e /e decrypts to 0, it implies it knows the plaintext in e . We divide the complexities analysis into on-line and off-line computations. To get the total number of exponentiations, we note that our protocol requires one private-multiplier gate at the first step (to produce e ), two private threshold decryptions (for decrypting e and e /e ) and one encryption at the last step (to generate e ). Therefore, we have in total 12 on-line and 12 off-line exponentiations.
Observe that the way of proving that the fresh commitment is correct in our protocol is different (yet equally efficient as the proof in [GMY04] ). The protocol in [GMY04] needs 9 exponentiations to recommit and prove. Our needs 9 exponentiations as well: produce e and one threshold decryption. technique we use is a little bit different from the general zero knowledge proofs.
If we restrict ourselves to a VOT protocol, removing the recommitment step, we can see our protocol is really much more efficient than the current protocols in the state-of-the-art. It certainly requires 7 on-line and 7 off-line exponentiations (against 11 and 10 resp. for Garay et al.'s protocol) and also in only one round of interaction. Ours easily generalizes to any (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem at a cost of a distributed key generation protocol at the beginning.
Concluding Remarks
As we mentioned before there is a generic attack that can be produced when oblivious transfer is used as a building block for higher level protocols implementations. Kiraz and Schoenmakers [KS06] present that there are several protocols for secure two-party computation using Yao's garbled circuit in the presence of malicious adversaries [Pin03, MNPS04, MF06] which have a security issue with the use of standard OT, and COT is presented as a direct solution. Generally, the problem arises due to the fact that there is no connection between the intermediate outputs in the protocol to the ones that are input for the OT protocols. We note that COT protocols (or any other combination of OT and commitments) may be therefore better to use within larger protocols assuming the correctness of the values inside the commitments. This correctness is controlled by the surrounding protocol and not by the COT protocol.
Moreover, there are a number of protocols for standard OT over bit strings which are profitable for many applications, and therefore, we stress that our COT protocol may also result in efficient implementations since it works for bit strings. Also we stress that once OT is used as a subprotocol in the semi-honest model, a COT protocol might be a good candidate to extend the higher-level protocol to the malicious case. Of course other solutions may be applicable though, but that would imply, in most of the cases, a redesign of the protocol being considered.
Finally, we highlight that our setting is quite different from the previous OT protocols. We use a (2, 2)-threshold setting in our protocol and of course, one might easily extend it to (2, n)-threshold cryptosystem. In particular it might be interesting the case n = 3 since still the adversary consists of only one party. The setting to adopt might clearly depend on the applications.
As further work, it could be interesting to present a protocol for committed oblivious transfer for bit strings in the universal composable framework and in the non-erasure model.
